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ABSTRACT
A defendant is criminally responsible for his action only if he is shown to
have engaged in a guilty act—actus reus (eg for larceny, voluntarily taking
someone else’s property without permission)—while possessing a guilty
mind—mens rea (eg knowing that he had taken someone else’s property
without permission, intendingnot to return it)—and lacking affirmative de-
fenses (eg the insanity defense or self-defense). We therefore first review
neuroscientific studies that bear on the nature of voluntary action, and so
could, potentially, tell us something of importance about the actus reus of
crimes. Then we look at studies of intention, perception of risk, and other
mental states that matter to the mens rea of crimes. And, last, we discuss
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studies of self-control, whichmight be relevant to some formulations of the
insanity defense. As we show, to date, very little is known about the brain
that is of significance for understanding criminal responsibility. But there
is no reason to think that neuroscience cannot provide evidence that will
challenge our understanding of criminal responsibility.
KEYWORDS: Intention and perception of risk, neuroscience and criminal
responsibility, neuroscience and law, self-control, voluntary action
I. INTRODUCTION
Shortly after turning 40 years old, Michael developed an interest in child pornography.
This was surprising because he had had no interest in such materials up to that point
in his life. He also found himself attracted to his 12-year-old stepdaughter, with whom
he and his wife lived. One night, while putting his stepdaughter to bed, he fondled her.
He was convicted of a crime of sexual molestation of a child. The judge gave Michael
the option of avoiding jail time should he pass successfully through a treatment pro-
gram. Anxious to avoid jail,Michael agreed.He did very poorly in the program. Among
other things, he came on to the staff and other patients. Michael also complained of
headaches, and a neurologist, working with the patients in the treatment program, rec-
ommended a structural magnetic-resonance imaging (MRI) of Michael’s brain. The
MRI revealed a large orbitofrontal tumor. Surgerywas performed to remove the tumor,
and, after recovery, Michael no longer had sexual urges directed towards children. He
returned to the treatment program and passed without difficulty, meeting the judge’s
demands. He returned home and seemed to be having no problems, beyond those that
might be expected of someone who had undergone brain surgery. Months later, how-
ever, his sexual desires for children returned. AnotherMRI revealed that the tumor too
had returned.The tumor was again removed, and, again, Michael’s urges went away.1
In one important sense, Michael’s case is so rare as to be, perhaps, unique. It is not
unheard of, although rare, for impulses to criminal behavior to be traceable to brain ab-
normalities. ButMichael’s case may be the only one to date in which the relevant brain
abnormality was also correctable through medical intervention. However, in another
important sense,Michael’s case is just like every case of criminal behavior. Criminal be-
havior is a product of the interaction between the states and functional dispositions of
thebrain, on theonehand, and the environment, on theother. Ifwe knewenough about
the brain, and if ourmedical technologywas sophisticated enough,wouldn’t every case,
in every courtroom, be just likeMichael’s?Wouldn’t it always be the case that we could
eliminate the impulse that gave rise to the crime through a medical procedure?2
Consider Michael’s case in relationship to a study conducted by Kiehl and col-
leagues, which investigated neural activity predictive of recidivism in criminals.Ninety-
six inmates, who were about to be released from jail, were instructed to press a button
as quickly as possible whenever an X appeared on the screen (84 per cent occurrence
probability), but not when a K was displayed (16 per cent occurrence probability).
1 Jeffrey M. Burns & Russell H. Swerdlow, Right Orbitofrontal Tumor With Pedophilia Symptom and Construc-
tional Apraxia Sign, 60 ARCH. NEUROL. 437, 440 (2003).
2 The medical procedures and technologies required to eliminate such impulses might be much more complex
than tumor removal, of course, and well outside the scope of our current knowledge.
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Using fMRI, the researchers tracked activity in the anterior-cingulate cortex (ACC)—
a limbic region associated with impulse control. They found that the odds that an of-
fender with low ACC activity would be arrested within 4 years of release were about
double those of an offender with high ACC activity. ACC activity was also a better re-
cidivismpredictor thanother factors, like age at release, substance abuse, task error rate,
and psychopathy score. Hence, the authors suggested ACC hemodynamic activity as
a potential neurocognitive biomarker of persistent antisocial behavior, at least at the
group level.3
A first and essential step towards appreciating the bearing of neuroscientific results
on criminal responsibility is recognizing the sense inwhichMichael’s criminal behavior,
and the criminal behavior of the inmates who recidivated in the study just described, is
no different from anyone else’s: such behavior has its source in the person’s brain and
his environment. There are two natural ways to respond to this: give up on criminal
responsibility all together, or, alternatively, accept that being fully responsible for bad
behavior is consistent with that behavior being explicable in principle through appeal
to facts about one’s brain and the environment inwhich one finds oneself.Those drawn
to the former viewmay be ready to stop reading this article now. If nobody is criminally
responsible for his behavior, then neither neuroscience nor any other science can help
us to understand criminally responsible behavior better; there is none.Those drawn to
the latter view, however, can seek ways in which neuroscience can, or does, inform our
understanding of the features of human beings in virtue of which they are criminally
responsible for their behavior. This is the approach taken in this article. We here sur-
vey some recent neuroscientific studies that might be thought to shed light on those
facts about people in virtue of which they are, and are held by our legal system to be,
criminally responsible for their behavior.
Under what conditions is a person criminally responsible for his behavior? Under-
standing the answer givenbyour legal system sufficiently for our purposes here requires
appreciating some legally defined concepts: actus reus, mens rea, and affirmative de-
fenses. Criminal statutes define crimes.These definitions are taken to express a series of
conditions that must be met, and must be shown to have been met by the prosecution,
for guilt. Under typical larceny statutes, for instance, a defendant is guilty only if he (a)
took something (b) that belonged to someone else (c) without permission, and while
(i) knowing that hewas taking it, (ii) being aware of a substantial risk that it belonged to
someone else, (iii) being aware of a substantial risk that he lacked permission to take it,
and (iv) intending never to return it. Roughly speaking, the non-mental facts that must
be shown to establish that a defendant meets a statutory definition of a crime, such as
(a), (b), and (c), are the crime’s ‘actus reus’. The mental facts, such as (i), (ii), (iii),
and (iv), are the crime’s ‘mens rea’. These are only rough definitions of ‘actus reus’ and
‘mens rea’, however, because some elements traditionally classified as actus reus include
facts about the defendant’s mind. Establishing that a person engaged, for instance, in
the act of taking something, requires proof that his bodily movements were guided by
his mind—a person who is holding a loaf of bread when someone throws him out of
the door of the bakery has not ‘taken’ the loaf. However, facts about the person’s mind
do not suffice.We also need to know that he had control of the object andmoved it out
3 Eyal Aharoni et al.,Neuroprediction of Future Rearrest, 110 PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. 6223, 6228 (2013).
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of the control of its rightful owner. So, more precisely, conditions that must be met for
guilt and are not exclusively facts about the defendant’s mind constitute the actus reus
of the crime. By contrast, conditions (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) are facts entirely about the
defendant’s mind; they constitute themens rea of the crime.
Engaging in a crime’s actus reus with its mens rea is necessary but not sufficient for
criminal responsibility. Additionally, a defendant must lack an affirmative defense. For
instance, someone who is suffering from a severemental illness that includes deific hal-
lucinations may delusionally believe that he must steal his neighbor’s car in order to
comply with God’s demands. When he does so, he may very well meet all of the con-
ditions required for commission of larceny. But he is not criminally responsible for his
behavior. The insanity defense is one example of an affirmative defense that might be
available in such a case. The affirmative defenses also include self-defense, defense of
others, and duress, among others.Whenever a defendant has an affirmative defense, he
is not criminally responsible, and so is not subject to punishment in the form of incar-
ceration, fines, or execution, nor is he subject to other forms of related state supervision,
such as probation. In the case of the insanity defense, however, he may be subjected to
involuntary commitment in amental institution, or be subject to other formsofmedical
intervention, through, for instance, outpatient programs, against hiswill. In general, any
condition that is necessary for criminal responsibility is necessary also for punishment
by the state, but in the absence of criminal responsibility, the state might still exercise
control over the agent, just not in the form of punishment.
Potentially, a neuroscientific result could show that a class of people, or perhaps,
even, an individual person, fails to meet, or succeeds in meeting, one of the necessary
conditions of criminal responsibility. If it could be shown, for instance, that peoplewith
orbitofrontal tumors like Michael’s typically meet the law’s criteria for insanity, then
such researchwouldprovide some support for the claim thatMichaelwasnot criminally
responsible for his behavior by supporting the claim that he had an insanity defense.We
would not know that for sure; Michael himself would need to be examined. But still,
such a result would provide some support for the claim that Michael is not criminally
responsible. Notice that such a result would not extend to everyone who engages in
criminal behavior. Some states of the brain—eg low ACC activity—that (when in the
right environment) give rise to criminal behavior might do so without it being the case
that the agent meets the law’s criterion for insanity. Sanity, like insanity, depends on
capacities that brains have. And criminal behavior by the sane, like such behavior on the
part of the insane, has its source in the brain. But, still, if the neural sources of insanity
canbe identified, thatwouldbeof potential use to the legal system.For example, a better
understanding of the neural basis of capacities underlying criminal responsibilitymight
shed new light on the standards that we apply for individuals having or lacking criminal
responsibility.
In addition, neuroscientific studiesmight illuminate the neuralmechanisms that un-
derlie those features of people in virtue ofwhich they are criminally responsible for their
behavior. And so they would help us to understand criminal responsibility better, with-
out thereby supporting an argument for or against holding any person or class of peo-
ple criminally responsible. While knowing more about a problem can be a first step to
solving it, knowingmoremight be valuable simply because it involves knowing more. In
the same way that the knowledge that the neuroscience of memory provides is of value
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even before we make use of it to treat memory disorders, or to improve our memories,
if neuroscience can help us to understand the neural nature of criminally responsible
behavior, that would be of value, even if we cannot use such knowledge to reduce crime
or increase justice. Such resultswould add tohumanknowledgenot just of the brain but
of one of the most socially important phenomena to which the brain gives rise: crimes
for which people are responsible and deserving of punishment.
Section I.1 of this article discusses neuroscientific studies that bear on the nature
of voluntary action, and so could, potentially, tell us something of importance about
the actus reus of crimes. Section I.2 discusses studies of intention, perception of risk,
and other mental states that matter to themens rea of crimes. And Section I.3 discusses
studies of self-control.The topic of self-control bears a less direct relationship to crimi-
nal responsibility than onemight think, for reasons that are explained. However, some-
thing like self-control is of relevance to some formulations of the insanity defense, and
to other issues important to the assessment of criminal responsibility. As we will see in
all three sections, the work that has been done to date is just the smallest drop in the
bucket. So far, very little is known about the brain that is of significance for understand-
ing criminal responsibility.
I.1. Voluntary action
It seems abhorrent to hold people criminally responsible only for their thoughts. And
it seems abhorrent to hold people criminally responsible for their status. It would be
wrong, that is, to punish people for intending to do things that they take no steps to-
wards doing—assuming, as seems plausible, that to intend something ismerely to have
a certain kind of thought about it; and it would be wrong to punish people for, for in-
stance, being poor, or unemployed, or belonging to a particular race or class.These base
level moral intuitions are accommodated in the law in part through a restriction on the
actus reus of crimes: the actus reusmust include a voluntary act. There are some excep-
tions to this—notably, people are also criminally responsible for omitting actions they
have a duty to perform—but, as a default, criminal responsibility requires a voluntary
act.
When definitions of voluntary action have been required for legal purposes, as when
it is less than obvious whether the defendant’s behavior amounted to voluntary action,
the law has employed something like the following definition: a voluntary act is a bod-
ily movement guided by a conscious mental representation of that bodily movement.
If a hurricane’s wind blows someone through a shop window, shattering it, there is no
guilt for destruction of property since the bodily motion that caused property to be
destroyed was not guided by the agent’s mental activity. The bodily movements dur-
ing an epileptic seizure, also, do not rise to the legal standard of a voluntary act since
the brain activity that gives rise to them does not guide them in the way, for instance,
in which a desire to move one’s hand guides one’s hand. Consider a more problem-
atic case. In People v. Newton4, the defendant was shot in the gut during an altercation
with police.Moments later, he shot and killed one of the officers before wandering sev-
eral blocks to a hospital where he collapsed, unconscious. Onwaking later, he reported
no memory of the incident. A doctor testified that it is common for people who have
4 People v. Newton (8 Cal. App. 3d 359 (Ct. App. 1970))
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just suffered severely traumatic injury, asNewton had, to engage in complex, seemingly
goal-directed bodilymovementswhile unconscious. Eventually,Newtonwas acquitted
on the grounds that the bodily movements in which he engaged when shooting the of-
ficer dead were not voluntary acts since the mental representations that guided them
were not conscious.5
The nature of voluntary bodily movements is amenable to investigation using neu-
roscientific tools. And, in fact, a substantial amount of neuroscientific work has been
done in this area. Some of this work might be thought to suggest that the law’s defini-
tion of voluntary action is deeply flawed. As we will see, to reach such a conclusion on
the basis of the work done to date, would be extremely rash.
In a seminal experiment, BenjaminLibet and colleagues asked subjects tomove their
right hand at a time of their choice while some of their brain activity was recorded using
electroencephalography.The subjects were seated in front of a rapidly rotating spot on
a clock and were instructed to recall, after they moved, its position when they first felt
the urge to move. On average they reported this urge about 200 ms before movement
onset. Yet, the experimenters found that a negative electrical potential above motor-
related areas of the cerebral cortex—termed a ‘readiness potential’ and known to pre-
cede voluntary action—began about 500 ms before movement onset.6 More recently,
it was shown that when subjects are instructed to press a button with the left hand or
another with the right, some information about which hand they would select could be
deciphered from functional magnetic-resonance imaging (fMRI) of frontopolar cortex
already 10 s or so before movement onset, well before subjects reported having made
up their minds (Fig. 1).7 The authors in these studies therefore concluded that it was
unconscious brain activity that initiated the action.
These experiments and their interpretation have come under much criticism, both
methodological and conceptual8. For instance, there is evidence that the timing of
the reported urge to move is systematically biased9 , retrospectively inferred from the
movement time rather than independently constructed.10 This casts doubt on the va-
lidity of subjective reports of the time of decision, and so challenges the original Libet
studies, where the readiness potential precedes the reported decision time by about
5 The case was racially charged. Newton was the head of the Black Panthers and hadmade explicitly threatening
remarks about the police on previous occasions. It is unlikely that Newton was stopped randomly. But the
explicit legal grounds on which the case was decided were not racial, even if the implicit grounds were.
6 Benjamin Libet et al., Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-
Potential) the Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act, 106 BRAIN 623, 642 (1983).
7 Chun S. Soon et al., Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human Brain, 11 NAT. NEUROSCI. 543,
545 (2008).
8 Benjamin Libet, Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action, 8 BEHAV.
BRAIN SCI. 558, 566 (1985); Jeff Miller, Peter Shepherdson & Judy Trevena, Effects of Clock Monitoring on
Electroencephalographic Activity Is Unconscious Movement Initiation an Artifact of the Clock?, 22 PSYCHOL. SCI.
103, 110 (2011);WALTER-SINNOTTARMSTRONG&LYNNNADEL (eds), CONSCIOUSWILLANDRESPONSIBILITY:
A TRIBUTE TO BENJAMIN LIBET (2011); ADINA L. ROSKIES, How Does Neuroscience Affect Our Conception of
Volition?, 33 ANNU. REV. NEUROSCI. 109, 130 (2010); Aaron Schurger, Jacoba D. Sitt & Stanislas Dehaene,
An AccumulatorModel for Spontaneous Neural Activity Prior to Self-InitiatedMovement, 109 PROC. NATL. ACAD.
SCI. E2904, E2913 (2012).
9 Uri Maoz et al., On Reporting the Onset of the Intention to Move, in SURROUNDING FREE WILL: PHILOSOPHY,
PSYCHOLOGY, NEUROSCIENCE 184, 202 (Alfred R. Mele ed., 2015).
10 William P. Banks & Eve A. Isham,We Infer Rather Than Perceive the Moment We Decided to Act, 20 PSYCHOL.
SCI. 17, 21 (2009).
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Figure 1. Decoding outcome of decisions over time before they
were reported to reach awareness.The three gray patches designate
regions where the specific outcome of a motor decision could be
decoded before it had been made (mean± s.e.m.; filled circles
indicate significant decoding accuracy at p< 0.05).The vertical red
line shows the earliest time at which the subjects became aware of
their choices.The dashed (right) vertical line in each graph shows
the onset of the next trial. (Adaptedwith permission fromSoon
et al., 2008.)
300ms, on average. It suggests that this gap between readiness-potential onset and the
reported time of the urge might be an artifact of the process through which the time
of the urge is inferred from the time of the movement rather than indicative of a gap
in time between the two events. It has also been shown that whenmonkeys are offered
one of several queries at random, frontal and striatal brain activity before the query is
presentedmay predict the monkeys’ eventual resolution of it, especially when the mon-
keys must decide between decision options of similar values.11 As randomly pressing
a button with the left or right hand with no purpose or consequence is a prototypical
situation where the values of the two decision options are very similar, the early fMRI
prediction signalsmay reflect bias activity rather thananearly formationof adecision12 .
Further, and importantly, when our concern is criminal responsibility we are interested
in deliberate decisions rather than the purposeless, insignificant and unreasoned ones
investigated in the Libet experiments. And so the Libet results do not generalize well to
decisions of the kind that bring people into courtrooms.13
11 Uri Maoz et al., Predeliberation Activity in Prefrontal Cortex and Striatum and the Prediction of Subsequent Value
Judgment, 7 FRONT. NEUROSCI. 225 (2013).
12 John-Dylan Haynes,Decoding and Predicting Intentions, 1224 ANN. N. Y. ACAD. SCI. 9, 21 (2011).
13 See Bruno G. Breitmeyer, Problems With the Psychophysics of Intention, 8 BEHAV. BRAIN SCI. 539, 540 (1985);
Adina L. Roskies, How Does Neuroscience Affect our Conception of Volition?, 33 ANNU. NEUROSCI. 109, 130
(2010); for example, for the generalization of the Libet results to deliberate decisions. Deliberate decisions
have begun to be studied in this context, Uri Maoz et al., Predicting Action Content On-Line and in Real Time
 at California Institute of Technology on O
ctober 31, 2016
http://jlb.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
What does recent neuroscience tell us about criminal responsibility?  127
But even if taken at face value, to conclude from such work that the law’s definition
of voluntary action is flawed would be very hasty. First, some might be drawn to the
idea that the experiments’ evidence of the predictability of decisions undermines the
voluntariness of subsequent behavior. But the law does not require that an act be un-
predictable in order to be voluntary. If a resolute person announces that he is going to
rob a bank tomorrow, we might be able to predict that he will do so with great reliabil-
ity, but we do not therefore conclude that his conduct is involuntary when he does as
he promised. We might also be able to predict quite reliably how a member of the Klu
Klux Klan will act towards a Black person. And we saw that ACC activity can to some
extent predict recidivism. But we would not conclude that the predicted behaviors in
such cases are, because predictable, involuntary.
Second, others may be struck by the experiments’ evidence that the agent carrying
out the action does not consciously recognize the psychological states accompanying
the neural activity that correlates with action as the source of subsequent bodily move-
ment. However, it is far from clear that the mental activity that is the immediate cause
of bodilymovement has been shownby such studies to be ‘unconscious’ in the sense that
matters for the law. Someone, for instance, who, in a rage, punches someone else in the
face, may not have been attending to his decision to do so—perhaps he was attending
only to the source of his anger—but it does not follow that his decision was ‘uncon-
scious’ in a sense that would disqualify his bodily movements from being voluntary in
the legal sense.
And, third, it may appear to some that the cause of subjects’ actions in those experi-
mentswas that early brain activity rather than conscious volition.But these experiments
provide no real evidence that conscious volition does not cause action. It is therefore
possible that the bodily movements of the subjects were both predictable from early
brain activity and, also, caused by their conscious volitions. But since causation by con-
scious volition is what is required for voluntary action under the law, it follows that it is
possible that the subjects acted voluntarily in the legal sense, despite the fact that early
brain activity predicted what they would do.14
Another set of experiments studied the awareness that people have of initiating, exe-
cuting and controlling volitional action—termed ‘the sense of agency’. While the law’s
definition of voluntary action does not appeal to the sense of agency, it is probably also
true that the intuitive appeal of the law’s conception of voluntary action derives from
the fact that willed bodily movements are, at least typically, accompanied by the sense
of agency. So, if there were reasons to believe that the sense of agency is an unreliable
guide to the voluntariness of the behavior it accompanies, then that would give us some
ground for concern about the law’s definition of voluntary action.
before Action Onset–an Intracranial Human Study, in 25 ADVANCES IN NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING
SYSTEMS 881, 889, and there is preliminary evidence that deliberate and randomdecisionsmay utilize different
brain processes; LiadMudrik et al.,Dissecting Different Types of Decision-Making: An ERP Study of Reasoned vs.
Unreasoned voluntary decisions, 43 SOC’Y NEUROSCI (2013).
14 For further discussion, see the essays collected in WALTER-SINNOTT ARMSTRONG & LYNN NADEL (eds),
CONSCIOUS WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY: A TRIBUTE TO BENJAMIN LIBET (2011); Adina L. Roskies, How Does
Neuroscience Affect Our Conception of Volition?, 33 ANNU. REV. NEUROSCI. 109, 130 (2010); Stephen J. Morse
&William T. Newsome,Criminal Responsibility, Criminal Competence, and the Prediction of Criminal Behavior,
PRIMER CRIMIN. LAW NEUROSCI. 150, 178 (2013); and Stephen Morse, Lost in Translation?: An Essay on Law
and Neuroscience, 13 LAWNEUROSCI., CURR. LEGAL ISSUES 529 (2011).
 at California Institute of Technology on O
ctober 31, 2016
http://jlb.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
128  What does recent neuroscience tell us about criminal responsibility?
Experiments on the sense of agency relied on patients in need of brain surgery (eg
for tumor removal, or for treatmentof intractable epilepsy),whooftenundergo invasive
brain mapping to minimize the impact of the surgery on their later everyday life. This
includes electrical stimulation of various brain regions to localize their involvement in
functionality (eg by eliciting hand movement or arresting speech). In one study, pa-
tients who underwent such stimulation of the supplementary motor area sometimes
reported an irrepressible urge to perform an action, or reported an anticipation that
action is about to occur, which was often followed by overt motor activity at higher
stimulation intensities. Some patients reported a subjective experience of movement
accompaniedbynoovertmotor activity.15 In another study, careful chronicling of stim-
ulation locations suggested that stimulating the right inferior-parietal regions triggers a
strong endogenous intention and desire for contralateralmovement, while left inferior-
parietal stimulation provokes an intention to move the lips and to talk. At higher stim-
ulation intensities, participants reported having performed these movements, though
no movement occurred. In contrast, premotor-region stimulation triggered overt con-
tralateral limb and mouth movements, while patients firmly denied having moved
(Fig. 2).16 This suggests that the sense of agency may not be as strongly coupled with
voluntary movement as humans generally experience them to be, and that—at least
under rather abnormal circumstances—humansmay experience agency over phantom
actions and carry out actions with no accompanying sense of agency. It appears, that is,
that the brain circuitry involved in the production of bodily movement may not be as
closely related to the circuitry involved in the sensation that one has planned, initiated
or even engaged in bodily movement as we might have thought.
Note that in the above experiments the sense of agency and action were never
aroused simultaneously. But imagine that a patient both carried out an act and thought
he was acting voluntarily due to artificial brain stimulation. Even if that were the case,
direct brain stimulation of an exposed brain is a highly unnatural condition. And it is
not clear to what extent such results could be generalized to more everyday decision-
making situations. The crucial question for our purposes here is this: do these exper-
iments show that bodily movements are not guided by conscious mental activity, as
required by the law’s voluntary act requirement? It is far from clear. At worst, a brain
stimulation experiment could be developed in which subjects are shown to be under
a certain kind of illusion: they think that they are acting voluntarily when they are not.
But the possibility of illusion in one case does not establish its ubiquity in all cases. Your
eyes can deceive you (think of optical illusions, for example), but that does not mean
that they always do.The existence of optical illusions does not render all vision illusory.
Further, it is not clear whether guiding one’s bodily movements through a conscious
mental state necessarily results in a sense of agency, or whether the sense of agency is
either necessary or sufficient for consciousness of the kind that the law takes to be in-
volved in voluntary action.These non-trivial questions might be answerable, at least in
part, using empirical means. But without the answers, there is no reason to take such
experiments to establish the inadequacy of the law’s definition of a voluntary act.
15 Itzhak Fried et al., Functional Organization of Human Supplementary Motor Cortex Studied by Electrical Stimu-
lation, 11 J. NEUROSCI. 3656, 3666 (1991).
16 MichelDesmurget et al.,Movement Intention after Parietal Cortex Stimulation inHumans. 324 SCIENCE 811, 813
(2009).
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Figure 2. Premotor and parietal responsive sites shown after registration of the individual
MR images to theMNI template. Left stimulations have been reported on the right
hemisphere. Colored areas define the anatomical boundaries of Brodmann Area (BA) 40,
BA 39, and BA 6. (Adaptedwith permission fromDesmurget et al., 2009.)
I.2. Intention and the perception of risk
Imagine that, as you are passing by, someone opens the trunk of his car revealing a stack
of new iPads still in their shrink-wrapped boxes. He offers to sell one to you for $200—
far below the typical retail price. You ask no questions and jump at the chance. Later,
you are arrested for the crime of receipt of stolen property. ‘But I didn’t know it was
stolen’, you say.Thismight be true. Perhaps you are just very na¨ıve and so believed that
the iPad was not stolen. Or perhaps you were not sure one way or the other, although
you recognized that there was a good chance that it was stolen. Whether you are guilty
of the crimedependson theexactmens rea standard set by the statutedefining the crime.
Does the statute prohibiting the crime require, for guilt, knowledge that the property
is stolen? Or will awareness of a large enough risk of that suffice? Or is it enough that a
reasonable (and, so, not na¨ıve) person in your situation would have known, even if you
did not?
The law recognizes that there are a variety of mental states that a person can be in
with respect to a particular fact, such as the fact that the property is stolen.The law also
recognizes that people vary in their culpability in accordance with these variations in
mental state. These are viewed as different kinds of mens rea. For our purposes here,
the most important types ofmens rea are intent and recklessness.TheModel Penal Code,
which has had tremendous influence on the law in the United States, defines ‘intent’
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or ‘purpose’ as having a particular act or causal result of that act as one’s ‘conscious
object’.17 This language is aimed at capturing the idea that those who intend acts or re-
sults aim at them, or make them their goal. By contrast, theModel Penal Code defines
‘recklessness’ as ‘awareness of a substantial and unjustifiable risk’ that one is acting in
a certain way, or that one will bring about a particular result through one’s act.18 As is
clear from the example of receipt of stolen property, it is possible to be reckless with re-
spect to a particular fact—in that example, the fact that the property is stolen—without
intending to bring it about. We can assume, in that example, that you did not intend
that the property you were receiving would be stolen; you would have been perfectly
happy to receive an iPad for $200, stolen or not. But you still may have been aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the property was stolen.
In this respect, some neuroscientific work purporting to be investigating the neural
mechanisms underlying intention are investigating a psychological state that is impor-
tantly different from the one towhich the law gives that label. For instance, in a series of
experiments using single-cell recordings and direct brain stimulation, Shadlen and col-
leagues had monkeys discriminate the direction of motion of moving dots, some per-
centage of whichmoved coherently in one direction while the rest jittered randomly.19
When a large percentage of dots move coherently toward a certain direction, while the
rest jitter back and forth randomly, discriminating the direction of motion is easy. In
contrast, if just a few percent of the dots move coherently, the task is more difficult.
They suggested that neurons found in the middle temporal (MT) areas code the noisy
evidence used for the decision, while neurons involved in integrating multiple pieces
of information in order to reach a decision are located at the lateral intraparietal area
(LIP).20 This LIP process seems to be involved in the integration of evidence until it
reaches a neuronal firing rate threshold associatedwith one of the decision alternatives,
which then leads to action.
While important for elucidating the neurophysiological process that accompanies
perceptual judgments, it is not clear to what extent these results can be thought to illu-
minate the neural substrates of intent as defined in theModel Penal Code. The buildup
of neuronal firing rate towards a threshold possibly reflects the accumulation of evi-
dence towards a finalized perceptual judgment, rather than an intention. Once the neu-
ral firing rate threshold is reached, the monkey recognizes that the dots are moving in
one direction or another, and thus the direction toward which saccading would bring
the greatest reward. But such a conclusion need not be an intention. The monkey’s
intention to get the juice reward, for instance, may combine with this perceptual judg-
ment in order to produce action, but the intention itself may be coded in neural activity
17 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Philadelphia: American Law Institute,
§ 2.02(2)(a)(i).
18 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Philadelphia: American Law Institute,
§ 2.02(2)(c).
19 Importantly, Shadlen tends to portray these experiments as investigating decisions rather than intentions. But
this is not the universal interpretation of their results.
20 Kenneth H. Britten et al.,The Analysis of Visual Motion: A Comparison of Neuronal and Psychophysical Perfor-
mance, 12 J. NEUROSCI. 4745, 4765 (1992); Michael N. Shadlen & Willaim T. Newsome,Motion Perception:
Seeing and Deciding, 93 PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI 628, 633 (1996); Joshua I. Gold &Michael N. Shadlen, Repre-
sentation of a Perceptual Decision in Developing Oculomotor Commands, 404NATURE 390, 394 (2000); Joshua I.
Gold &Michael N. Shadlen,TheNeural Basis of Decision Making, 30 ANNU. REV. NEUROSCI. 535, 574 (2007).
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Figure 3. (A) an illustration of the task progress. (B) Brain regions encoding the subjects’
specific intentions during either the delay (light gray) or execution (dark gray) periods.
(MPFCa, anterior medial prefrontal; MPFCp, posterior medial prefrontal cortex; LLFPC,
left lateral frontopolar cortex; LIFS, left inferior frontal sulcus; RMFG, right middle frontal
gyrus; LFO, left frontal operculum.) (Adaptedwith permission fromHaynes et al., 2007.)
distinct fromwhat is found in LIP orMT.Theneural activity that such studies associate
with an ‘intention’ to move towards a target could, instead, underlie the reaching of a
factual conclusion—a conclusion about which direction the dots are moving, and so
which direction promises the greater juice reward. But beliefs about matters of fact are
not intentions in the sense identified by theModel Penal Code.
Studies in which subjects are induced to have intentions of a sort that are closer to
those that are of legal relevance can be found.21 For instance, Haynes and colleagues
had subjects decide whether they would prefer to add or subtract two double-digit
numbers, without at that point knowing what the numbers were. After a variable de-
lay period lasting a few seco nds, they were presented with the two numbers for two
seconds. Then followed a screen containing the sum and difference of the two num-
bers as well as two distractors, randomly placed, and the subjects indicated their choice
(Fig. 3A).22 The experimenters strived to decode whether subjects intended to add
21 The law is concerned both with so called ‘distal’ intentions, or intentions to act in the future, and ‘proximate’
intentions, or intentions to act now. However, distal intentions matter to criminal liability only to the degree
to which they are executed through the formation of later proximal intentions. In the study described in the
main text, the focus is on the neural activity underlying the formation of the distal intention, but the experi-
mental setup assures that subjects that follow the experimenter’s instructions will act on that intention later,
presumably through the ultimate formation of a proximate intention.
22 The random placement of the sum, difference, and distractors meant that the intentions decoded in this study
were not simply for the upcoming motor activity, as the subjects could not know the mapping of the response
buttons to the answer alternatives until the final screen was presented.
 at California Institute of Technology on O
ctober 31, 2016
http://jlb.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
132  What does recent neuroscience tell us about criminal responsibility?
or subtract the numbers from brain data recorded using fMRI during the delay pe-
riod, before the numbers were presented. They achieved an accuracy of 71 per cent
from the anterior medial prefrontal cortex and above 60 per cent from other regions of
the lateral prefrontal cortex, all at significantly above-chance levels. None of these ar-
eas contained addition/subtraction-divergent information after the numbers were re-
vealed (Fig. 3B).23
In the Haynes study above, the subjects had no reason to keep their choices hid-
den from the experimenter. Yet, to what extent could intentions be decoded from
neural activity in a competitive situation where revealing them is detrimental? Maoz
and colleagues decoded the motor intentions of participants in a matching-pennies
game. Sitting across from their opponent, the two players had to raise one hand at
the go signal. And it was agreed that the subject would win $0.10 from his opponent
if the hand he raised was a mirror image of his opponent’s. Otherwise, he would lose
$0.10 to his opponent. Both players started with $5, and if the subject was the over-
all winner over the 50 trials of the game, he received his final winnings in cash. The
subjects—consenting epilepsy patients implanted with intracranial electrodes for clin-
ical purposes—therefore had every incentive to keep their intentions hidden from the
experimenter (Fig. 4A), though theywere not explicitly informed that their brain activ-
ity would be used to decipher their actions. Nevertheless, subjects’ intentions could be
decoded at rates of about 70 per cent correct, on average, online and in real time, and
used against them in the game.The prediction accuracy rose to 83 per cent, on average,
in more rigorous offline analysis, and up to 92 per cent, on average, when the system
was allowed to make predictions only on the 70 per cent of the trials on which it was
most confident (Fig. 4B).24
But correlation does not entail causation. Is the brain activity on the basis of which
the subjects’ intentions could be decoded the same as that throughwhich the intention
is stored, or does it merely accompany it? In addition, there is mounting evidence that
the intuitively appealing model of serial decision making guiding experiments of this
kindmaynot be accurate.Under this intuitivemodel, decision-making involves a three-
step process: (1) gathering information from the senses to form a percept, (2) forming
an intention to act in accordance with a decision made on the basis of the percept, and
(3) executing the action. Instead, some evidence suggests that sensory information is
used to continuously specify several potential actions in parallel, and often in the same
brain regions that later control the chosenbehavior.25These processes donot stoponce
23 John-Dyaln Haynes et al., Reading Hidden Intentions in the Human Brain, 17 CURR. BIOL. 323, 328 (2007);
Chun S. Soon et al., Predicting Free Choices for Abstract Intentions. 110 PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. 6217, 6222
(2013).
24 UriMaoz et al., Predicting Action Content On-Line and in Real Time before ActionOnset – an Intracranial Human
Study, in 25 ADVANCES IN NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS (2012).
25 Paul Cisek & John F. Kalaska,Neural Mechanisms for InteractingWith aWorld Full of Action Choices, 33 ANNU.
REV. NEUROSCI. 269, 298 (2010); David Freedman & John Assad, A Proposed Common Neural Mechanism
for Categorization and Perceptual Decision, 14 NAT. NEUROSCI. 143, 146 (2011); Joshua I. Gold &Michael N.
Shadlen,TheNeural Basis of Decision Making, 30 ANNU. REV. NEUROSCI. 535, 574 (2007); JosephW. Kable &
Paul W. Glimcher,TheNeurobiology of Decision: Consensus and Controversy, 63 NEURON 733 (2009); Michael
N. Shadlen et al., Neurobiology of Decision Making: An Intentional Framework, in BETTER THAN CONSCIOUS?
DECISION MAKING, THE HUMAN MIND, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONS (ENGEL C. & SINGER W., eds,
2008), 71, 102; Steven P. Wise et al., Premotor and Parietal Cortex: Corticocortical Connectivity and Combina-
torial Computations 1, 20 ANNU. REV. NEUROSCI. 25, 42 (1997).
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Figure 4. (A)The experimental setup in the clinic.The patient and experimenter are
watching the game screen (inset on bottom right) on a computer (bottom left) and still
pressing down the buttons of the response box.The real-time system already computed a
prediction, and thus displays an arrow on the screen behind the patient and plays a tone in the
experimenter’s ear ipsilateral to the hand it predicts he should raise to beat the patient. (B)
Across-subjects average of the prediction accuracy (mean± s.e.m. shaded) versus time before
the go signal. Values above the dashed horizontal line are significant at p= 0.05. (Adaptedwith
permission fromMaoz et al., 2012.)
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the movement begins, even when sensory input is then suspended, facilitating poten-
tial changes ofmind.26Therefore, intentionmight not be clearlymappable onto a single
neural process, and the brain may contain representations of multiple, conflicting ac-
tion plans. If so, then further conceptual work will be needed to determine what it is,
exactly, that distinguishes an intention, in the sense that matters to criminal responsi-
bility, from other mental states representing action plans in accordance with sensory
information.
Turn now to recklessness—awareness of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of a fact
of legal importance; for example, risk that the iPad was stolen, in the example above.
Many neuroscientific studies examine theway inwhich people process probabilistic in-
formation and use it in decision-making. One famous set of studies use the Iowa Gam-
bling Task, developed by Damasio and colleagues. Normals and patients with bilateral
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) damage picked cards from four decks ran-
domlybearingpositiveornegativemonetary rewards.The total positive reward indecks
A and B were double that in decks C and D. But A and B were stacked so that selecting
cards from themwould result in a loss overall, while selecting fromC orDwould result
in a gain. The players, who were instructed to gain as much money as possible, knew
nothing about the setup of the decks or when the gamewould be stopped. Normals be-
gan to choose advantageously—ie selecting mainly from C and D—before they could
report any knowledge about the advantageous strategy. They also generated anticipa-
tory skin-conductance responses (SCRs) before selecting from the riskier A or B decks,
and 70 per cent of them could spell out how the decks were set up before the end of the
game. The patients neither chose advantageously—generally preferring cards from A
and B—nor generated SCRs, not even the 50 per cent who eventually could explicitly
explain how the decks were set up.27 It therefore seems that, at least when people are
asked tomake decisions such as those involved in the IowaGamblingTask, the vmPFC
is required for collecting information about risks to be used in the guidance of reward-
seeking action.
In another study, Glimcher and colleagues tested for neural differences in the pro-
cessing of risk and ambiguity using fMRI. Both are situations where the outcomes as-
sociated with decision alternatives are not certain. Under risk, the probabilities of the
different outcomes can be estimated, whereas under ambiguity these probabilities re-
main unknown. In themain experiment, subjects were instructed to blindly extract one
chip from an urn containing overall 60 red and blue chips, and told which color was as-
sociated with a cash reward; the other color was associated with no reward.They were
also informed of the size of the reward—5, 9.5, 18, 34 or 65 dollars. In risk trials, the
subjects were told the proportion of red and blue chips in the urn (12.5, 25 or 37.5,
62.5, 75 or 87.5 per cent red). In the ambiguity trials, the subjects were only informed
of the range of the proportion of red and blue (37.5 to 62.5 per cent, 25 to 75 per cent,
or 12.5 to 87.5 per cent red). The subjects had to decide between either the risky or
26 Arbora Resulaj et al., Changes of Mind in Decision-Making, 461 NATURE 263, 266 (2009); Luc P. J. Selen,
Michael N. Shadlen & Daniel M. Wolpert, Deliberation in the Motor System: Reflex Gains Track Evolving Ev-
idence Leading to a Decision, 32 J. NEUROSCI. 2276, 2286 (2012).
27 Antoine Bechara et al.,Deciding Advantageously Before Knowing the Advantageous Strategy, 275 SCIENCE 1293,
1295 (1997);AntoineBechara et al., Insensitivity to FutureConsequences FollowingDamage toHumanPrefrontal
Cortex, 50 COGNITION 7, 15 (1994).
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ambiguous choice on the one hand and a 50 per cent chance of winning $5 on the other
hand.Three of their choices were selected at random, and subjects took out chips from
urns with the parameters in those trials at the end of the game, winning the cash re-
ward if they took out the right chip. The researchers found that the subjective value of
the choice under both risk and ambiguity activated the same brain areas (up to fMRI
resolution)—medial prefrontal cortex and striatum—although the activation for am-
biguity was greater than for risk.28
The law does not distinguish between risk and ambiguity. A defendant who knows
when he fires a five-chamber gun at another that the gun contains two bullets, is act-
ing while aware of a risk. A defendant who fires the same gun while knowing that it
contains either one, two or three bullets acts while aware of ambiguity. But both defen-
dantswould be classified as reckless under the law.The fact thatGlimcher’s study seems
to indicate a neural commonality in the representation of risk and ambiguity suggests
that the law may be right not to distinguish the two when it comes to criminal respon-
sibility. This is not to imply, however, that the law would need to be changed were it
discovered that neural representations of risk and ambiguity are distinct. The possibil-
ity would remain that the different neural activities have the same import for criminal
responsibility.
While the representation of probabilistic information is a part of the legal notion of
recklessness, it is not exhausted by that idea. Even setting aside the fact that for reck-
lessness the probabilities in questionmust be ‘substantial’ and conduct in light of them
must be ‘unjustifiable’, a crucial aspect to the legal notion of recklessness is conscious
awareness of probabilistic information. The thought is not just that the reckless agent
represents information about the risks of harming others but also that he acts in a way
that imposes those risks while aware of the possibility, although not the certainty, of
harm. Awareness of risks is crucial to the thought that the reckless agent is criminally
culpable.Where there is awareness of risk, and action that imposes the risk, there seems
to be a disregard of the importance of the harms that are being risked. To date, few if
any neuroscientific studies have investigated the distinctive nature of conscious aware-
ness of risk, distinguishing its neural basis, and role in decision making, from tacit, or
unconscious representations of probabilistic information.
One area where the law could particularly use assistance from neuroscience con-
cerns the impact of mental disorders onmental states crucial to criminal responsibility.
Broadly speaking, for instance,weknow that addiction involves disruptionof dopamine
signals and also that brain areas mediated by dopamine, such as the striatum, are cru-
cial to processing and learning from probabilistic information.29 We would therefore
expect that addicts would be consciously aware of risks in different ways, and in differ-
ent patterns, from non-addicts. How exactly addictionmodulates conscious awareness
of risk would be important information for the legal system. A large number of addicts
find their way into courtrooms, and a crucial question in many of their trials is whether
28 Ifat Levy et al.,Neural Representation of Subjective Value under Risk and Ambiguity, 103 J. NEUROPHYSIOL. 1036,
1047 (2010).
29 Howard C. Cromwell &Wolfram Schultz, Effects of Expectations for Different Reward Magnitudes on Neuronal
Activity in Primate Striatum, 89 J. NEUROPHYSIOL. 2823, 2838 (2003); Bernard W. Balleine, Mauricio R. Del-
gado & Okihide Hikosaka, The Role of the Dorsal Striatum in Reward and Decision-Making, 27 J. NEUROSCI.
8161, 8165 (2007). See also [ref to Volkow et al. chapter in this volume].
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they were reckless with respect to the harms they caused when they acted. But at the
moment, the legal system does not incorporate any empirical information about the
ways in which addicts represent and process information about risks when reaching
judgments about their criminal responsibility. In part, this is because the legal system
is slow to incorporate scientific information, and with good reason. The gap between
the lab and the world is often too wide to warrant changing the way legal judgments
are made. But it is also because scientific studies of decision in the face of risk, and the
ways in which decisions are modulated by mental disorders, have not been guided by
the conception of risk perception thatmatters to the criminal law, namely the legal con-
ception of recklessness. Significant progress could bemade in this area—progress that
might point theway to substantial legal reform—byneuroscientific research thatwould
be guided from the outset by the entrenched legal concepts, like that of risk perception.
Similar points can be made about the bearing of mental disorders on intention, and
other mental states that matter tomens rea. More work in this area can be, and should
be done.
I.3. Self-control
The thought that the capacity to control oneself is crucial for responsibility is a deep-
seated feature of our moral lives. Intuitively speaking, of those who harm others, some
are in control when they do so; others have lost control, but could have been in con-
trol had they, for instance, stopped to think at an earlier time; and still others have lost
control, and it was impossible for them to have maintained it. And these intuitive dif-
ferences seem to matter to responsibility. These three kinds of agents, that is, seem to
differ from a moral point of view.
For themost part, the criminal law is insensitive to thesemoral differences, although
it is a further question whether it should be. It is very rare for a difference in treatment
under the criminal law—punishment rather than release, or more punishment rather
than less, for instance—to turn on a finding to the effect that the defendant was or was
not in control, or couldor couldnothavebeen.There are someexceptions. For instance,
a defendant who is very upset when he kills another person will, if various other condi-
tions aremet, be guilty not ofmurder but of the lesser crime ofmanslaughter, which can
bring substantially lower penalties. It is possible that the law grants mitigation in such
cases through a recognition of the fact that at least some who kill while in a state of ex-
tremely heightened emotion are less than fully in control of what they are doing. How-
ever, similar mitigation is not available to those who, for instance, commit the crime
of destruction of property while very upset, as when a person smashes his girlfriend’s
windshield after an argument. Mitigation in such cases is specific to homicide, which
is a far less common crime than many others. This indicates the rather stingy attitude
in the law towards basing differences in treatment on differences in control. Still, there
are other important exceptions to this. Under one formulation of the insanity defense,
although by no means the most common formulation, it is sufficient for excuse from
criminal responsibility that, due tomental illness that gave rise to the relevant conduct,
the defendant ‘lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law’.30 Under this so-called ‘volitional prong’ of the insanity defense, those who
30 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Philadelphia: American Law Institute,
§ 4.01(1).
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Figure 5. (A) Depictions of the experimental progress during the health, taste and decision
blocks (in grayscale). (B)The vmPFC (top) may control the DLPFC (bottom) through an
intermediate brain region like IFG (inferior frontal gyrus, BA 46; middle). (Adaptedwith
permission fromHare et al., 2009.)
cannot, or find it extremely difficult, to dowhat the law requires of them are not subject
to criminal punishment (although as noted in the introduction they may be subject to
commitment in amental institution). In addition, theSupremeCourt has recently ruled
that adolescents who have committed very serious crimes, includingmurder, ought not
be punished as severely as otherwise identical adults in part on the grounds that ado-
lescents, as a group, are more impulsive than adults.31 So, the court seems to predicate
an important difference in legal treatment of adolescents, although not adults, on a dif-
ference in the capacity for self-control. It is also possible that a deeper scientific under-
standing of control and its limits could come to inform the law. Perhaps if more were
known about the factors that influence self-control, and impose limits on it, and more
were known about how self-control can be measured, the legal system would come to
predicate more differences in treatment under the law on differences in control. Only
time will tell.
Important neuroscientific work on self-control has emerged in recent years, al-
though it remains uncertain how, if at all, it bears on criminal responsibility. For in-
stance, Rangel and colleagues first instructed hungry dieters and non-dieters to make
choices about either the healthiness or taste of various foods on a five-point scale
(Fig. 5A). One item that was rated as neutral on both scales was then taken as the refer-
ence food for each subject, and subjects were told to repeatedly choose between differ-
ent foods and that reference food. Tomake the choices concrete, one trial was selected
at random and the subjects had to eat the food selected on that trial.They then divided
the subjects into self-controllers (SC) and non-self-controllers (NSC) based on their
behavior during the experiment (eg declining unhealthy, liked items).
Using fMRI, the researchers found that activity in the vmPFC was corre-
lated with the subjects’ choices, regardless of the self-control they exhibited. Also,
vmPFC activity was correlated with both taste and health for SC, but only with
taste for NSC. In contrast, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) activity in-
creased during successful self-control trials and was then also correlated with
31 Roper v. Simmons (543 U.S. 551 (2005)),Grahamv. Florida (130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010)),Miller v. Alabama (132
S.Ct. 2455 (2012)).
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vmPFC activity. They therefore suggest that vmPFC reflects short-term goals
(taste), which are then modulated by long-term considerations (health) using the
DLPFC. And that the extent to which DLPFC can modulate vmPFC activity ac-
counts for much of the difference between successful and unsuccessful self-control
(Fig. 5B).32
Work can also be found on the neural substrates of psychological tools that
people can employ, with varying degrees of success, in resisting temptation. For
instance, Ochsner and colleagues investigated the neural bases of two emotion
regulation strategies: attentional distraction and cognitive reappraisal. Distraction
draws selective attention away from evocative aspects of an event (eg telling
your child a story while she receives a shot). Reappraisal involves cognitive ef-
fort to reinterpret a situation’s affective meaning (eg learning to reinterpret criti-
cism as constructive rather than a threat to self-esteem). Before showing subjects
negatively affective pictures for 8 s, the researchers instructed them to attend to
them (control), decrease the affect (reappraisal) or remember a string of letters
(distraction).
They found that both strategies successfully reduced emotional experience and
amygdala activity, while engaging prefrontal and cingulate regions implicated in cog-
nitive and emotional control. Reappraisal was a more effective strategy, and preferen-
tially activated medial prefrontal and anterior temporal regions associated with affec-
tivemeaning.Distraction decreased amygdala activitymorewhile increasing prefrontal
and parietal activation, associated with selective attention, to a greater extent. The re-
searchers therefore hypothesized that while distraction simply resulted in decreased
processing of affective meaning, reappraisal required the regulation of attention and
processing of affective meaning.33
Howwork of this kind bears on criminal responsibility is far from clear. Self-control
appears to be highly variable within subjects, and highly context-sensitive. Someone
with grave difficulty in resisting tempting food might have no problem resisting temp-
tations to steal. And someone who has trouble resisting the temptation to mildly harm
another person while playing a game in a lab might never be tempted, or might have
no trouble resisting such temptations, when not playing games, or when outside the
lab. In addition, how much, and what sort, of self-control is required for moral re-
sponsibility, much less criminal, is itself difficult to specify. So very little can be said
with confidence about what recent work on the neuroscience of self-control impli-
cates, if anything, about criminal responsibility. Potentially, however, work of this kind
could provide the first steps in helping us to determine in what ways particular psy-
chological disorders do indeed result in the absence of ‘substantial capacity to con-
form one’s conduct to law’ in the sense that is sufficient for insanity under some legal
definitions. Much work, however, would need to be done before such steps could be
taken.
32 Todd A.Hare, Colin F. Camerer, & Antonio Rangel, Self-Control in Decision-Making InvolvesModulation of the
vmPFC Valuation System, 324 SCIENCE 646, 648 (2009).
33 Kateri McRae et al.,TheNeural Bases of Distraction and Reappraisal, 22 J. COGN. NEUROSCI. 248, 262 (2010).
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II. CONCLUSION
As indicated in the introduction to this article, many of the most difficult, and deepest,
questions about criminal responsibility and the brain are no more, or less, tractable in
light of recent neuroscientific experiments. Is there something about the dependency
of our mental life on the state of a physical organ that is incompatible with criminal
responsibility? If so, then descriptions of how exactly the mind, and the behavior to
which it gives rise, are dependent on that organ will likely tell us nothing about crimi-
nal responsibility. But on the assumption that criminal responsibility is not just here to
stay—as it surely is—but should be here to stay, there is room to ask towhat extent neu-
roscience can illuminate the nature and underlying mechanisms of those features that
contribute to and constitute criminal responsibility. The question is very much worth
asking, and while some work has already been done in this direction, as described in
the previous sections of this article, there is much more work ahead for a confidently
positive answer.34
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